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Abstract
Despite its immense benefits in terms of flexibility, resource consumption, and simplified man-
agement, cloud computing raises several concerns due to lack of trust and transparency. Like all
computing paradigms based on outsourcing, the use of cloud computing is largely a matter of trust.
There is an increasing pressure by cloud customers for solutions that would increase their confi-
dence that a cloud service/application is behaving in a secure and correct manner. Cloud assurance
techniques, developed to assess the trustworthiness of cloud services, can play a major role in build-
ing trust. In this paper, we start from the assumption that an opaque cloud does not fit security,
and present a reliable evidence collection process and infrastructure extending existing assurance
techniques towards the definition of a trustworthy cloud. The proposed process and infrastructure
are applied to a case study on cloud certification showing their utility.
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1 Opaque cloud does not fit security
The cloud computing paradigm provides a vision of IT where resources are consumed and leased on
demand and on a pay-per-use basis. The immense benefits of the cloud in terms of flexibility, resource
consumption, and simplified management, make it the first choice of users and industries for deploying
their IT architecture, and for service provisioning and procurement. However, the benefits of the cloud
do not come for free. Cloud computing raises several concerns due to lack of trust and transparency [?],
while customers need guarantees on cloud services non-functional properties (e.g., security, privacy).
Unfortunately many cloud services providers still fail to provide complete transparency regarding the
security and privacy compliance measures they have in place to protect their customers sensitive
information and intellectual property. Of course cloud providers have deployed security controls to
prevent attacks and unauthorized activities. However, information about such controls’ operation
and their effectiveness is rarely made available to customers. As a consequence, cloud users do not
have access to all security intelligence and log information on potential threat vectors, which impairs
their ability to estimate risks [?]. Service providers are especially reluctant to take full responsibility
over security and privacy breaches of their services, while cloud users increasingly ask for trustworthy
evidence on the status of service security.
In the last few years, after the cloud has reached functional maturity, the research community has
focused on protecting security and privacy of its users from different angles [?]. Several techniques have
been proposed, including solutions to protect confidentiality and integrity of data and applications,
maintain isolation among cloud tenants, and identify malicious and fraudulent activities. Despite the
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good intention behind such efforts, they have led to the proliferation of heterogeneous approaches
and to increased user confusion. Indeed, the perception that the operation of different security and
privacy controls may be affected in a different way by virtualization and cloud-specific factors is a
main obstacle to cloud adoption in emerging domains, such as big data domains [?].
It clearly emerges the need of increasing the cloud transparency by providing reliable evidence
on the behavior of the cloud and its services. Traditional security verification techniques composed
of static analysis approaches are not enough and must be extended to support continuous evidence
collection from in-production cloud services at runtime. A proper evidence collection process provides
the basis of a trustworthy cloud; the absence of non-transparent evidence on the contrary hinders
users’ trust on the real cloud behavior and prevents users from taking full advantage of the cloud
functionalities.
2 Assurance vs security
The definition of a transparent and trustworthy cloud is fundamental to widen its adoption in critical
scenarios managing sensitive data and applications. Recently, security solutions have been considered
as the key enablers towards increasing trust in the cloud. However, their role fall far short of expec-
tation due to the fact that involvement of customers and service providers in security management is
reduced by lack of trustworthy evidence on their behavior. It has then become a mantra to consider the
cloud an as “environment where magic happens”, while at the same time an “untrusted environment”.
To fill in this gap, security assurance techniques have been introduced to increase transparency in
the working of cloud services and corresponding security techniques [?, ?, ?, ?], and in turn increase
the confidence of customers that their data and the applications they use/own are treated according
to their wishes. Often security and security assurance are considered similar concepts and used in
an interchangeable way. However, though related, they are profoundly different as discussed in the
following two definitions.
• Cloud security can be defined as a way to actively protect assets (data and applications) by
internal and external threats and attacks, to provide an environment where customers interact
in a secure way.
• Cloud security assurance can be defined as the way to gain justifiable confidence that infras-
tructure and/or applications will consistently demonstrate one or more security properties, and
operationally behave as expected despite failures and attacks [?,?].
The notion of security includes all those mechanisms (e.g., encryption, access control, trusted com-
puting) necessary to provide a given security property. The notion of assurance instead complements
the one of security by providing methodologies for collecting and analyzing evidence that can prove
or refute security properties. Generally, there are different assurance techniques that can be readily
deployed in the cloud such as audit, certification, and compliance techniques. Though intrinsically
different, they share a common aspect that supports the implementation of a trust model based on
each of them: they need to collect and validate reliable evidence to prove a given security property.
The research on assurance is therefore moving from the definition of new assurance techniques to
the definition of reliable approaches to evidence collection at the basis of a trustworthy cloud. Reliable
evidence collection is key for increasing the perceived trust of the users in the cloud. To be effective,
evidence collection processes must follow some basic requirements, which are summarized below.
R1 – Trusted authority. An evidence collection process SHOULD be controlled and managed by
a recognized, independent, trusted authority.
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R2 – Standardized evidence collection. The evidence SHOULD be collected in a standardized
way (independently by the considered system) and according to different collection mechanisms
(e.g., testing, monitoring, trusted computing). Heterogeneous data schemas and formats should
be managed according to common machine-readable documents providing guidance for agents
implementing the collection process.
R3 – Verifiable evidence. Collected evidence MUST be verifiable and its integrity guaranteed
according to standardized techniques.
R4 – Integrity of collecting infrastructure. The integrity of the infrastructure used for evidence
collection MUST be protected and continuously verified.
R5 – Continuous and real time. To accommodate the dynamic and adaptive nature of the
cloud, cloud service behavior MUST be continuously checked, through a continuous and real-
time process for evidence collection.
R6 – Multi-layer and multi-target. Evidence collection SHOULD cope with multi-layer and
multi-target cloud scenarios, where evidence is collected at all layers of the cloud stack.
The above requirements [R1–R6] represent the basis to implement a trustworthy assurance infras-
tructure for a cloud environment.
3 Evidence collection makes cloud transparent
An evidence collection process for the cloud works at all layers of the cloud stack and executes on
the target cloud-based service. It implements a continuous and real-time process where heterogeneous
agents (i.e., probes) inspect the cloud behavior and produce evidence on a service status. To support
the need of standardizing evidence collection, our process is driven by an Evidence Collection Model
(ECM), a machine-readable document describing i) how evidence should be collected from the Service
Under Verification (SUV) and ii) how the evidence should be aggregated to support a given property.
ECM defines all the activities required for deploying and executing the evidence collection process. The
probes implement such activities and execute them on the SUV for gathering the required evidence. To
this aim, the SUV owner provides cloud hooks, that is, a description of cloud configurations (e.g., access
credentials, IaaS configurations) and service end-points available for evidence inspection. Figure 1
summarizes our methodology. A property is verified for a specific SUV, according to constraints posed
by a trusted authority. Evidence is continuously collected by exercising the SUV according to ECM.
It is then given as input to the corresponding security assurance technique that eventually triggers
changes in the property verification results (e.g., the status of a certificate, the outcome of an audit
process) following a predefined life cycle. The life cycle defines the states of the assurance process and
how they can be reached depending on the results of the evidence collection and aggregation.1
3.1 Evidence types
The evidence can be of three different types, test-based evidence, monitoring-based evidence, Trusted
Computing-based evidence, as follows.
1An example of life cycle is presented in Section 4.
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Figure 1: Conceptual representation of the methodology
Test-based evidence. Test-based evidence is a major source for software assurance [?] and, recently,
has been applied to assurance scenarios focusing on service [?, ?] and cloud-based [?] system. It is
suitable for testing of software/services in both lab and in-production environments. In a test-based
evidence collection model, i) the evidence is represented as the set of test cases to be executed on the
SUV, ii) the probes are scripts injecting test cases via the SUV’s hooks and collecting corresponding
results, iii) the hooks are a set of configurations and available end-points permitting probe execution.
The definition of mandatory test cases is driven by constraints defined by the trusted authority in the
ECM, which specify the least set of testing activities to be done on the SUV for a successful verification
process supporting a given property.
Monitoring-based evidence. Monitoring-based evidence has been largely used in Intrusion Detec-
tion System (IDS)/Intrusion Prevention System IPS for evaluating complex system behavior. Recently,
it has been proposed also for service and cloud verification [?]. Monitoring-based evidence is suitable
for dynamic collection of evidence and/or for security properties that cannot be tested online (e.g.,
DDOS robustness or robustness to penetration attacks). In a monitoring-based evidence collection
model: i) the evidence is the set of monitored events, ii) probes correspond to event captors that may
intercept events sent to or by the system that is being monitored, or internal events of this system
which are being audited through some event capturing mechanisms (e.g., audit facilities of web servers,
databases), iii) the hooks are implemented as an event bus collecting all the required events from the
SUV. ECM for monitoring defines the set of expected events, and the (temporal) patterns that they
should comply with for the property under verification to hold.
Trusted Computing-based evidence. Trusted Computing-based evidence has been only recently
applied to cloud assurance [?], with the aim of guaranteeing that assurance results actually refer to
targeted services in the cloud. Trusted Computing (TC) technology is a hardware-based approach for
ensuring the integrity of IT systems. A secure hardware device called Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
is used to perform security measurements of a running system and to produce dynamic evidence of its
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state.2 Such evidence is included in assurance techniques for the cloud by i) specifying information to
allow clients to verify the integrity and state of the running service, and ii) modifying the semantics
so that only proofs for which the former verification succeeds are considered valid. TC-based evidence
can be used to verify properties of either platforms or services running in the cloud, or to produce
dynamic evidence based on the actual behavior of a system. TC-based evidence can also be used to
verify the integrity of components used for the collection of testing- and monitoring-based evidence.
3.2 Evidence collection processes
To address the requirements introduced in Section 2, an evidence collection process based on the types
of evidence in Section 3.1 must support hybrid evidence collection and incremental verification. To
this end, we analyze two evidence collection models, namely, Hybrid ECM and Incremental ECM.
Hybrid evidence collection model. It is used when SUV includes mechanisms requiring different
types of evidence to be effectively verified [?]. Hybrid ECM can be enacted using two different models.
• Full Hybrid model. A single Hybrid ECM is specified describing an evidence collection process
based on probes gathering different types of evidence. Probes run in parallel or in a sequence.
The trusted authority then specifies how to correlate the multi-type evidence according to the
life cycle in hybrid ECM.
• Hybrid by Combination model. Multiple ECMs are specified to collect different types of evidence
and drive different collection processes. One ECM is designated as the assurance process owner
(i.e., Master ECM), while the others are acting as auxiliary processes used for providing evi-
dence results when required (i.e., Slave ECMs). The master gathers the results of the evidence
collection process of the slaves, and integrates them within its own process on the basis of its
life cycle.
The Fully Hybrid model requires a custom ECM designed for supporting hybrid evidence collection,
while Hybrid by Combination requires independent auxiliary evidence collection processes. As an
example, a Hybrid by Combination model can collect test-based evidence of SUV behavior and TC-
based evidence on the integrity of the testing probes collecting such evidence.
Incremental evidence collection model. It improves the resilience of assurance processes and
corresponding results to cloud events. It minimizes the amount of activities to be done, when events
at cloud, service, and assurance levels affecting existing processes are observed [?]. Incremental ECM
extends the life cycle to manage scenarios where assurance results are invalidated. Its goal is to reduce
as much as possible the window of time in which the assurance results are invalid, while minimizing
the amount of additional activities needed to bring back the assurance results to a valid state.
Assurance results might become inconsistent due to events that temporarily or permanently inval-
idate part of the collected evidence. Such events can be classified as follows.
• Service-level events, where evidence is insufficient for a given period of time due to SUV evolution
(e.g., service versioning) and/or contextual changes (e.g., service failures). Focusing on SUV
evolution, let us consider property data-leakage-prevention [?] based on 3DES encryption. If a
new version of the service is released without support for 3DES encryption, the property is no
longer supported by the collected evidence. Otherwise, if contextual changes cause a failure in
2https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/
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the mechanism implementing 3DES encryption, evidence becomes insufficient and the assurance
results are invalidated. As soon as the mechanism returns available, the assurance results become
again valid.
• Cloud-level events, where evidence is insufficient due to specific cloud events (e.g., service migra-
tion). For instance, let us consider property data-leakage-prevention [?] based on an encrypted
storage. If the service is temporarily moved to a different infrastructure providing a storage ser-
vice with no support for encryption, the property is no longer proven by the collected evidence.
• Assurance-level events, where all or a part of the evidence becomes invalid/contradictory, because
new conditions and constraints for the validity of the property for a specific SUV are introduced
by the trusted authority. For instance, a new bug/vulnerability has been discovered for a specific
mechanism (e.g., heartbleed openssl bug – http://heartbleed.com/) and needs to be verified
on the SUV.
The above classes of events trigger an incremental ECM requiring one or more of the following
activities.
• Adaptation. No evidence collection activities are requested. Incremental ECM only adapts
assurance results.
• Evidence collection re-execution. Observed events require to re-execute (part or all) evidence col-
lection activities. It is usually due to service- and cloud-level events (e.g., different configurations
or context), and requires the re-execution of probes on (different) hooks.
• New evidence collection activities. Observed events require to execute new assurance activities.
It is usually due to service-level events (e.g., a new version of the service), and requires the
definition of new probes and hooks.
• Re-evaluation from scratch. Observed events require a complete re-evaluation of the SUV. It can
be due either to service-level events (i.e., SUV evolution) or assurance-level events.
3.3 Evidence collection infrastructure
The European FP7 Certification infrastrUcture for MUlti-Layer cloUd Services (CUMULUS) project,3
aiming to define models, processes, and tools for cloud certification, has implemented an assurance
infrastructure based on certification. Here, we concentrate on the portion of the CUMULUS infras-
tructure managing the evidence collection processes in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. It is implemented as a
master-slave distributed architecture (Figure 2), composed of two main components: Evidence Col-
lection Manager (EM) and Evidence Gathering Agent (EA). The Evidence Collection Manager – the
master of the evidence collection process – provides the interface used by the trusted authority (Cer-
tification Authority CA in CUMULUS) for defining and managing all evidence collection activities
(dotted lines in Figure 2). It implements the following features: i) fully automatic set up of collection
activities, including slave initialization, ii) aggregation of the results of the evidence collection activ-
ities, iii) life cycle evaluation, and iv) support for evidence collection processes. Evidence Gathering
Agent – the slave of the evidence collection process – is responsible for SUV evaluation. It deploys and
executes probes, collects evaluation results, and returns the results of the evidence collection activities
to the Evidence Collection Manager. Agents require confidential information (hooks) of the cloud/ser-
vice providers (e.g., internal configurations, authorization credentials) for connecting the probes to
3http://www.cumulus-project.eu/
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Figure 2: Evidence collection architecture.
the target SUV, and can be deployed inside (internal cloud evaluation) or outside (interface-level
evaluation) the target cloud, depending on the level of intrusiveness that might be tolerated by the
cloud/service providers themselves.
Both deployment strategies build on a chain of trust where the trusted authority delegates (part
of) the assurance and evidence collection processes. In a cloud environment, in fact, differently from
traditional assurance where the trust model is based on a trusted authority responsible for the whole
assurance process, the trust is shared among the trusted authority and its accredited lab executing
ECM by means of the Evidence Collection Architecture. More in detail, the chain of trust of a cloud
assurance process relies on the trust the client has on i) the trusted authority (oﬄine actor) signing
the assurance results, responsible for the definition of authority constraints, and in charge of checking
that these constraints are addressed by ECM, ii) the accredited lab (online actor) delegated by the
trusted authority and responsible for the correct execution of ECM and corresponding life cycle, iii)
the integrity of the Evidence Collection Architecture, and its correct configuration and deployment by
the accredited lab on the basis of ECM.
The evidence collection infrastructure accomplishes all requirements in Section 2. It is driven by
a trusted authority requirements [R1], and provides a standardized evidence collection model based
on machine-readable documents and common agents [R2]. It provides verifiable and reliable evidence
through the definition of standardized hooks interfacing with the Service Under Verification (SUV)
[R3]. It is based on trusted computing platforms to verify the integrity of evidence collection agents
[R4]. It implements a continuous and real-time collection at all layers of the cloud stack [R5, R6]. The
infrastructure supports some additional requirements. First, it supports a distributed deployment over
the cloud. Then, it provides auto-configuration of evidence collection agents, implementing a semi-
automatic assurance process, and adapts to changing conditions in the cloud. Finally, it can be trusted
to manage the assurance process as expected and in a correct way. An open source implementation
of the CUMULUS evidence collection infrastructure, which supports a test-based evidence collection
process, is available at http://goo.gl/98vuYr, where the code of the manager and the agent, as well
as some examples of probes, are referenced.
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Figure 3: Certificate life cycle
4 Case study: Certification in the cloud
We present a case study on cloud certification, where the CUMULUS infrastructure is used to demon-
strate the utility of the evidence collection processes in Section 3. A certification process is driven
by a pair composed of a non-functional property to be certified and the target of certification (ToC),
that is, a specific instantiation of a generic SUV. Non-functional properties could span different do-
mains of software and services including security, privacy, reliability, and performance, to name but a
few. Examples of non-functional properties can be found in [?], which defines among others security
properties like data leakage prevention and data exchange confidentiality, and privacy properties like
timely access and deletion ability. The goal of a certification process is to guarantee a target level of
assurance, by (semi-)automatically collecting evidence supporting the fact that the ToC actually holds
the desired property. Often, some constraints are given on the amount and composition of evidence
that must be collected to guarantee an adequate level of assurance, and on the tools used to collect
them in-production or in a lab environment. If evidence meets certification constraints, a certificate
is awarded to the ToC.
The case study considers a real-world industrial scenario consisting of an application for the remote
management of public lighting (lighting application for short). The application provides real-time in-
formation system performance and infrastructure status. It is deployed on OpenStack, an open source
IaaS solution that permits to manage and monitor infrastructure resources, stores applications cre-
dentials in a MySQL database, and provides a storage for lighting’s information. We present two
certification processes. The first is based on an hybrid evidence collection process and is aimed at cer-
tifying property data alteration prevention; the second is based on an incremental evidence collection
process and is aimed at certifying property confidentiality of exchanged data. Evidence is collected
according to Certificate Life Cycle (CLC), which describes the evolution of the certificate status from
its issuing (i.e., evidence is sufficient to prove a property for the ToC) to its revocation, suspension,
expiration, or re-newing. CLC is modeled as an automaton (see Figure 3), where each transition be-
tween two certificate states is regulated by specific conditions on the collected evidence. Specifically,
the transition between states NI and I, denoted NI→I (dashed arrow in Figure 3) is regulated by issu-
ing conditions. When issuing conditions are verified, a certificate is issued. Subsequently, if collected
evidence becomes insufficient to prove the property, then the certificate is suspended and moves to
state S (I→S ). The certificate returns to state I (S→I ), if the evidence returns sufficient (certificate
re-new). State R (certificate revocation) is reached when the collected evidence is contradictory and
does not prove the property (e.g., a successful attack is observed). State E (certificate expiration) is
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Figure 4: Certification of property data alteration prevention
reached when the certificate validity expires. We note that states R and E are sink states and trigger
re-certification from scratch.
Property data alteration prevention. Figure 4 presents a certification process based on hybrid
evidence for certifying lighting application against property data alteration prevention. The property
requires that only authorised users can update a file. To certify it, the infrastructure uses an hybrid
by combination model, where a master ECM based on monitoring drives a slave ECM based on
testing. As depicted in Figure 4, after a user’s request for updating a file (fileWriteAccess(file, user))
is received by the application (step 1), it is forwarded to the CUMULUS monitoring agent (step 2).
The monitoring agent, which is not able to verify that the user has the rights to execute the request,
asks the test manager via the monitoring manager to execute a test case (executeTest(user, file)).
The test case needs to ensure that the user had the appropriate authorisation rights (step 3). The
test manager instructs the test agent to execute function checkPermission(user, file) (step 4) and the
latter returns the result to the monitor agent (step 5). We note that testing/monitoring managers
are the evidence collection managers and testing/monitoring agents the evidence gathering agents of
the evidence collection architecture in Figure 2. The condition for certificate issuing in the lifecycle
((NI→I ) in Figure 3) requires the user to have access rights to the file. If this is confirmed by the
testing agent the certificate for property data alteration prevention is awarded.
Property confidentiality of exchanged data. Figure 5 presents a certification process based on
incremental evidence for certifying lighting application against property confidentiality of exchanged
data. The property requires the application to offer a confidential network channel for data exchanged
with external parties. To certify it, the infrastructure uses a test-based incremental evidence collection
model, checking the robustness of the HTTPS communication channel between the application and
external parties. The condition for certificate issuing in the lifecycle ((NI→I ) in Figure 3) requires
lighting application to support TLS/SSL with strong chipers. We use the customized Nmap script
engine to collect information about TLS/SSL for the application communication channel, including
the certificate time validity, the TLS/SSL version, and the supported ciphers. Upon a successful veri-
fication is performed and a certificate awarded for the application, we start a continuous certification
process. For instance, let us assume that a new bug is discovered on the HTTPS implementation used
by the application (e.g., Heartbleed Bug of openSSL). The certificate is suspended according to the
lifecycle (I→S ) and new evidence is collected to verify robustness of the HTTPS against the bug. If
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Figure 5: Certification of property confidentiality of exchanged data
the verification succeeds the certificate comes back to the issued state (S→I ), otherwise it is revoked
(S→R) according to the lifecycle. Figure 5 shows the whole verification chain leading to certificate
revocation.
5 Outlook on future work
Cloud assurance can make the difference in the next evolution of cloud computing. Increasing the
assurance in the cloud in fact could attract new businesses, which operate in security-critical environ-
ments, and accelerate their movement to the cloud.
However, much work still needs to be done. Firstly, costs and risks must be carefully evaluated
when an assurance architecture is integrated within the cloud infrastructure. Secondly, impact on
cloud performance must be minimized in order to maintain high quality of service for the cloud.
Finally, a proper assurance approach should i) maximize evidence re-use by composition, ii) maximize
service quality by discovering and selecting the best services on the basis of the assurance results,
iii) support an enhanced architecture able to share evidence results at runtime and on demand, and
iv) take advantages by emerging big data analytics techniques.
Given the dynamics of the cloud and the need of managing evolving evidence, a sound trust model
must be defined, departing from the assumption of having a trusted authority available anytime
anywhere, as well as an approach to the dynamic generation of assurance results.
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